


































Copyright 2000 by S. Malla and R. Gray. All rights reserved. Readers may make 
verbatim copies of this document for non-commercial purposes by any means, 
provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies. 
 
                                                 
* Stavroula Malla is a SSHRC Post-Doctoral Fellow in the Department of Agricultural Economics of 
the University of Saskatchewan, and a visiting scholar at the Department of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics of the University of California at Davis.  Contact: S.Malla@usask.ca or 
malla@primal.ucdavis.edu . 
† Richard Gray is a professor in the Department of Agricultural Economics of the University of 




An Analytical and Empirical Analysis of the Private Biotech R&D Incentives 
By 
 





The study examines the incentives and incidence of private R&D investment in the 
today’ biotech industry.  A three-stage search/imperfect competition model is 
developed to derive the optimal pricing and investment decisions of private firms and 
to develop conjectures about how these decisions are affected by exogenous factors.  
The analysis shows that basic public research “crowds in” applied private research 
while applied public research “crowds out” applied private research.  The current 
technology level and the cost of the experimentation negatively affect private 
investment, while the price of the final product positively affects the private 
investment.  Moreover, the greater the product heterogeneity, the higher the price 
charged with the same amount of R&D.  Finally, the increase in IPR’s and the firm’s 
market size has a positive effect on the private firm’s amount of R&D investment.   
These conjectures are tested empirically using data from the Canola research industry. 
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1. Introduction 
  Agricultural research is an important driver of economic growth.  Specifically, 
technology is a key determinant in economic growth at the national level (Solow 
1957, Romer 1990).  It was shown that the post-war growth in agriculture has 
exceeded the growth in other sectors (Jorgenson and Gollop 1992).  Alston et al. 
(2000) estimate that the average reported rate of return for agricultural research and 
development worldwide is 73 per cent per year.  Consequently, agricultural R&D 
investment is a very important economic issue.   
Crop research has undergone a major transformation in North America and 
many other parts of the world.  In the 1980s crop varieties were open-pollinated, non-
transgenic and had no effective Plant Breeders Rights (PBR).  However, in the 1990s 
PBR were established, the US patent office started to recognize the biotech process, 
and the industry often had license agreements for products.  Finally, some of the 
technologies allowed exclusion from others from using it, such as hybrid varieties 
that require the purchase of the seed every year in order to keep the desirable traits, 
herbicide-tolerant varieties that tied to the use of particular herbicides or designer 
varieties meant to be processed in a specific place.   
As a result of all these changes, the products of research are now effectively 
protected by IPR, which were made enforceable through the use of biotechnology.  
Biotechnology and IPR have altered the nature of the research products from non-
rival and non-excludable to rival and excludable goods. This change in the nature of 
research products transformed most crops from a public good to excludable private 
goods. At the same time, the inherent non-rival nature of research products, meaning   2 
that the production function exhibits increasing returns to scale (Romer 1990), tends 
to create a concentrated private crop industry as firms move to capture economies of 
scale and scope (Fulton 1997, Fulton and Giannakas 2000).  A further push toward 
integration occurs as firms adopt strategies to preserve their own freedom to operate 
(e.g., vertical integration, mergers) (Lesser 1998, Enriquez 1998, Linder 1999). 
Traditionally, most research was a result of public investment and the 
products of the research were public goods (Huffman and Evenson 1993).  However, 
the establishment of enforceable IPRs creates an incentive for private investment 
because the inventor can extract the most of the economic rents from his investment 
by retaining ownership over the new technology.  Consequently, research funding has 
changed for most crops (Malla, Gray and Phillips 1998; Malla and Gray 1999; Gray 
and Malla 2000; and Gray, Malla and Ferguson 2000).  Over time, research has 
shifted from a modest public investment to large private investment.  This funding 
shift is evident in the registration of new varieties.  Prior to the 1970s most varieties 
were public, but now they are private.  Finally, the public sector has further 
stimulated the growth in private investment by providing private research incentives 
(e.g., research grants, research subsidies, invest in infrastructure).  The combined 
effect has been an increase in research investment by the private sector and very 
different rules for agricultural research. 
The existing economic literature has not adequately addressed these issues.  
The contributions on the returns to agricultural research mainly examine the 
economic implications of public research investment in the absence of IPRs and 
under perfectly competitive market structure (for review and summary of this   3 
literature see Alston, Marra, Pardey and Wyatt 2000).  A number of more recent 
studies examined R&D issues in an imperfectly competitive framework and show that 
while IPRs create incentives to invest they may also create market power and 
efficiency (deadweight) losses (e.g., Moschini and Lapan 1997, Fulton and Keyowski 
1999, Alston, and Venner 2000).  Several studies have examined whether public 
funded R&D substitutes for (“crowds out”) privately funded R&D, or complements 
(“crowds in”) private expenditure analytically (e.g., Warr 1982, Roberts 1984, 
Bergstrom et al., 1986) and empirically (e.g., Khanna et al., 1995, Khanna and 
Sandler 1996, Diamond 1999, Johnson and Evenson 1999).  Steinberg (1993) and 
David, Hall and Toole (1999) provided a survey of the available empirical evidence 
and concluded that they results are inconclusive regarding the direction and the 
magnitude of the relationship between public and private research expenditure.   
One other related issue is that most economic studies either do not distinguish 
between basic and applied research, or assume a linear pipeline relationship (e.g., 
Grilliches 1986, Adams 1990, Huffman and Evenson 1993, Thirtle et. al 1998).  
Recently, a few studies modeled the link between basic and applied research with 
more complexity and in some cases in a nonlinear manner (e.g., Rosenberg 1990 and 
1991, Pavitt 1991, Brooks 1994, Dasgupta and David 1994, Pannell 1999, Rausser 
1999).  However, these papers tend to make assumptions  about the relationship 
between basic and applied research.   
Few research contributions model agricultural crop research as a search 
process in a very basic framework (e.g., Evenson and Kislev 1976).  The search 
process allows us to recognize research as a stochastic process with sporadic   4 
outcomes, which is more consistent with the nature of the agricultural research 
process.  Moreover, the search process allows us to account for the effect of basic 
research on applied research.  The manner by which basic research affects applied 
agricultural research is embodied in the model.  Hence, the available research 
contributions have not sufficiently addressed the economic issues of the 
contemporary R&D industry.   
The goal of this thesis is to develop a broader understanding of how 
biotechnology, changes in IPRs and the resulting changes in industry structure have 
affected the private and public incentives for agricultural research.  The specific 
objectives include to developed an analytical framework to examine: (1) the 
incentives for private R&D expenditure; (2) the spillovers between basic and applied 
research; (3) the spillovers between private and public research; (4) how the changes 
in IPRs affect private investment; and (5) how the firm’s market size affects private 
investment; and an empirical examination the theoretical findings of this study.  To 
achieve the objective of this paper, a stochastic analytical model within an imperfect 
competitive framework, which accounts for product differentiation and farmers 
heterogeneity, was developed.   
The remainder of the paper is organized into three sections.  Section 2 
develops the analytical framework for this analysis, which is used to derive a number 
of propositions on the key economic issues.  Section 3 presents the econometric 
analysis and the regression results of the model.  Finally section 4 contains a 
summary and the concluding comments of the paper.     5 
2. Theoretical Development of The Model 
The behavior of the imperfectly competitive research firms is modeled in three stages.  
In the first stage, each firm (private and/or public) decides on the optimal number of 
research trials, which creates a differentiated variety with a specific expected yield.  
In the second stage, given this yield, each research firm chooses the price they will 
charge for the variety.  In the third stage, farmers look at the prices and yields of the 
varieties and choose the varieties to purchase on the basis of net returns.  The model 
is solved using backward induction.  The framework developed captures essential 
elements of today’s research industry: that is, the small number of research firms with 
market power selling differentiated products to heterogeneous farmers.   
2.1 Exponential Distribution of the Largest Values 
The search process is a sequence of independent experiments composed of nt 
trials.  Each trial is a test of specific traits or techniques that could increase the current 
yield.  In a breeding program the crop breeders will typically cross two parent 
varieties and will use research trials to search among the offspring for the highest 
yielding genotype with desirable agronomic and quality characteristics.  For 
simplicity, it is assumed that each trial results in a single observation or outcome 
(specific yield level); that is, one random draw from a population (the distribution of 
yield).1  Hence, the control variable is the number of trials (the extent of 
experimentation) and the state variable is the current yield level.  The outcome of the 
experiment is the observation in the sample that could most increase the current yield.  
                                                 
1 In reality, a yield trial is often carried out with a number of replications.  Experimental designs use 
replication (repeated plantings of the varieties) to minimize the variation of non-genetic factors (e.g., 
weeds, moisture) in the estimation of the potential yield.     6 
To derive the expected value of the best observation in the sample, the n
th order 
statistic and the extreme value statistic is calculated (Gumbel, 1958; Epstein, 1960).   
The model that follows is illustrated in terms of the exponential distribution.  
The exponential distribution is chosen mainly because it provides an explicit and 
tractable formula for determining the distribution of order statistics.2  Moreover, the 
type of research the exponential distribution describes is typified in biological 
processes or crop research like canola and wheat (e.g., monotonically decreasing 
probability density function).   
In terms of the exponential distribution, the expected value of the increase in 
yield is (Evenson and Kislev 1976): 
(1)  En(∆ y) =
1− [1− e
− λ ( y− θ )]
i
λ i i= 1
n
∑  
Allowing n to be a continuous variable, the sum by integration is: 
(2)  En(∆ y) =
1− [1− e







To take the derivative of the change in yield of the exponential distribution 










                                                 
2 Generally, it is not easy to derive an explicit and tractable formula for the distribution of order 
statistics (Epstein, 1960).   
3 If z= f (x,y)dy
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∫ dy   7 
2.2 Third Stage: Farmers’ Demand for the Variety 
The development of the analytical model begins with the third stage, where 
the farmers’ demand for the varieties is derived.  There are N farmers.  All farms are 
the same size, k acres, and each farmer (i) has homogeneous land with a unique 
characteristic ψ i (e.g., soil quality, weed infestation, management skills) that varies 
across farms.4  To simplify the analysis, the characteristic ψ i uniformly distributed 
between 0 and 1. Farmers purchase either variety A or variety B from firm A or B 
respectively.5  Variety A is best suited to farmers for land characteristic ψ i=0 while 
variety B is best suited for ψ i=1.  The modeling framework accounts for the case of 
complete and incomplete property rights.  It is assumed that the private firms are risk 
neutral,6 which may accurately reflect the investment behavior of the very large, 
diversified multinational firms involved in crop research today.  It is also implicitly 
assumed in the model that there are no terms of trade effects (i.e., a small country 
assumption), and the output price, p is exogenously defined.   
                                                 
4 Alternatively, k could represent a uniform field size, such that each farmer could operate several 
fields making separate variety decisions on each field of quality ψ i. 
5 Having a fixed amount of crop area to be allocated between varieties is consistent with a crop that is 
constrained by rotational considerations.  An alternative specification, which allows for substitution 
between this crop and others as well as between varieties would complicate the demand relationships 
and make the pricing decision of the two firms more complex.  With this additional complexity, 
determining the private equilibrium outcomes and the optimal public policy would be more difficult or 
even intractable. 
 
6 When the decision maker is risk-averse, risk considerations will affect the amount of research the 
research firm is undertaking.  The risk-averse decision maker is likely to carry out more research trials 
than a risk-neutral decision maker given the risk-reducing effect of extra experiments in the sense that 
the variance of the n
th order statistic (the maximum value of an experiment) in most cases declines, the 
more trials the breeding firm is undertaking (Sunding and Zilberman, 2000).     8 
The objective of each farmer i is to maximize profit by selecting variety A, φ i , 
or variety B, 1-φ i ,7 subject to the inequality constraint  1 0 ≤ φ ≤ i .  It can be written as: 
(4)  Max Π i =sp[∆ y
A+τ(1−ψ i)]kφ i-kφ i  w
A+sp[∆ y
B+τψ i)]k(1-φ i)-k (1-φ i) w
B 
   φ i 
1 0 . . ≤ φ ≤ i t s  
where:  
k = the area seeded by each farmer  
φ i  =  the proportion of area seeded to variety A 
w
A = the price of seed of variety A 
w
B = the price of seed of variety B 
p = the price of output 
ψ i = the land characteristic of farmer i 
τ =   the change in yield associated with a unit change in the differential attribute8 
∆ y
A+τ(1−ψ i) = the expected yield of variety A for producer of characteristic ψ i 
∆ y
B+τψ i = the expected yield of variety B for producer of characteristic ψ i 
s = the proportion of the value generated from the variety that a farmer is willing to 
pay in the market place to purchase the variety directly from the breeding firm 
( 1 0 ≤ ≤ s )9   
                                                 
7 Every producer, except one where  1 0 < φ < , is at a corner point.   
8 The assumption of heterogeneity can be relaxed in the modeling framework by reducing τ  towards 
zero, making the two varieties nearly perfect substitutes for one another.  In the case of perfect 
substitutes,τ  would be equal to zero and internal solutions involving two firms would be indeterminate.  
This is a perfect competition case, where price is equal to marginal cost and the firm’s profits would be 
equal to zero.   
9 For instance, when s<1 farmers’ opportunity cost of not purchasing the variety directly from the 
breeding firm is low because they have other ways to obtain the seed (e.g., the “brown bag” market).  
Hence, they are willing to pay something less than the full value of the variety to breeding firm, which 
represents the case of incomplete IPRs.  Fully appropriation of R&D benefits occur when s=1.   9 
The value of  i ψˆ  --which is the land quality of a farmer who is indifferent 







A w sp y sp w sp sp y s − ψ τ − ∆ = − ψ τ − τ + ∆ ˆ ˆ , or:  
(6)  i
B A B A w w y y
ψ =
τ




All farmers with land quality less than  i ψˆ purchase variety A, while all 
farmers with land quality greater than  i ψˆ purchase variety B.  Given that  i ψˆ  is 
uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, then the market share of variety A is defined 
by i ψˆ .   
The demand for variety A is equal to the product of the number of farmers, the 
amount of acreage each farmer has, and the market share for variety A (Q
A=Nk i ψ ˆ ).  
Given that we choose units of quantity such that Nk is equal to 1, then the demand for 
variety A is equal to the market share for variety A (Q
A= i ψ ˆ ).  As is shown in 
equation 6, the demand for variety A is an increasing function of its own yield and the 
other price and a decreasing function of its own price and the other yield, and the 
overall responsiveness is in proportion to the total seeded acreage and is inversely 
related to τ,  the yield differential per change in unit of land quality. 
2.3 Second Stage: Pricing of the Varieties 
Having estimated farmers’ demand for varieties A and B, the optimal pricing 
by firms A and B can be derived.  A model with differentiated goods and a Nash 
equilibrium in prices is used to model the duopoly.  The firms do not charge at   10 
marginal cost because they face a downward-sloping demand for their products, 
which is a function of their own price and the price charged by the rival.  As 
mentioned previously, research firms A and B sell differentiated varieties to a group 
of heterogeneous farmers.  At the Nash equilibrium, neither firm can achieve a higher 
profit by changing the price charged for its product.  The firms operate in a single 
period and pick a price level10, where marginal revenue of the residual demand facing 
each firm from the sale of their variety is equal to the marginal cost of marketing and 
reproducing the seed.  The objective of firm A is to maximize its profits, which is:   
(7)  Max Π
A = w
A
i ψˆ - L i ψˆ  
where L= marginal cost of marketing and reproducing of the seed 




















Solving for seed price w
A and w
B, the best-response function of firm A and B can be 
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+ τ + ∆ − ∆
=   
Substituting firm B’s best-response function w
B into firm A’s best-response function, 
the Nash equilibrium can be determined.  At the Nash equilibrium, the price charged 
by firm A is equal to w
A*, while for firm B it is equal to w
B*.  
 
                                                 
10 It is assumed that price is the strategic variable of the research firms.     11 
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The optimal price charged (w
A* and w
B*) is a function that increases in proportion to 
the present value of the future stream of benefits the firms can capture.  Hence, the 
more appropriable the research benefits are, the more firms charge for the variety they 
developed.   
Having estimated the Nash pricing for firm A and firm B, the reduced form for 
the optimal market share for variety A can be estimated by substituting w
A* and w
B 













The optimal market share for variety A (or the fraction of farmers purchasing 
variety A) is an increasing function of the difference between expected yield of 
variety A and variety B.  The response of ψ i
* to a change in the expected yields is a 
decreasing function of τ , the degree of heterogeneity of producers.   
2.4 First Stage: Optimal Investment 
In this section, the optimal research investment for firm A and firm B is 
derived given farmers’ demand for the varieties and the optimal pricing of the 
varieties by the firms.  In this normative approach, the optimal search behavior is 
estimated as the difference between the expected gain from the search and the cost of 
the search (e.g., Stigler 1961; Nelson 1970).  Specifically, given the farmer’s demand 
for the varieties and the optimal pricing of those varieties, firms will determine the   12 
extent of their experimentation, which is the optimal number of research trials 
(control variable).  The indirect profit function for firm A is defined as: 
(14)  Π
A=w
Aψ i*- L*ψ i 
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Firm A’s objective is to choose the number of trials that maximizes its indirect 
profit function while it considers the cost of the experimentation.  Hence, the problem 
firm A faces is: 
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− c = 0 
Assuming that firms A and B are identical in the sense that they have the same 
cost of experimentation and the same expected change in yield, then the FOC for firm 























− c = 0   13 
Additionally, given that  ) ( ) (
B A y E y E ∆ = ∆  (by the symmetry assumption) the FOCs 
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A − c = 0, or 
1
3
sp{1 − [1− e





A = c  
This condition states that the expected profits from R&D search are maximized when 
the marginal values of the expected benefits are equal to marginal costs.  Finally, the 
second-order condition (SOC) with respect to the number of trials, hereafter referred 
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A2 = H < 0 
 
2.5 Propositions Regarding the Effect Exogenous Variables  
Given the nature of the expression, we were unable to estimate a closed-form 
solution for n
A.  Hence, the Implicit Function Theorem is applied to determine the 
effect of the exogenous variables on the number of trials the firm is undertaking.  The 
relationship between the exogenous (policy) variable and the optimal level of private 
research n is derived in the form of propositions. 
Proposition 1: A decrease in the marginal cost of experimentation will increase the 
number of research trials and the private firm’s R&D search. 



















The denominator of the above comparative static is the SOC of the expected profit 
maximization (from equation 22) and therefore is negative in sign.  The numerator of 
the above expression represents the change in the marginal benefit of the research 
investment with respect to the cost of the experimentation, which is negative in sign.  
Hence, the cost of the trials negatively affects the number of trials that are 
undertaken.  This result also shows that government policy which reduces the firm’s 
per-unit cost of trials would increase the optimal amount of research undertaken. 
Proposition 2: An increase in the output price (the price that farmers receive for their 
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The numerator of the above expression represents the change in the marginal benefit 
of the research investment with respect to the output price.  Given that 0<e
-x<1, and 
that λ >0, z>0, y>0, then  1 ] 1 [ 1 0
) ( < − − <
θ − λ −
A n y e , which results in a numerator that is 
positive in sign.  From the SOC, the denominator is negative in sign.  Hence, the 
output price positively affects the number of trials.  An increase in the area of crop 
would have the same effect as an increase in the price of the product and would 
increase the amount of private investment in research. This also suggests that low-  15 
value crops and those grown on small areas would attract little private research 
funding. 
  The following two propositions examine the relationship between basic 
research and applied research.  Basic research can affect the distribution of R&D 
outcomes for a given R&D activity.  For the exponential distribution, basic research 
can affect the parameters λ  and θ .  As stated above the mean of the exponential is θ  + 
1/λ  and the variance is 1/λ
2.  Basic research could increase θ  thereby increasing the 
lower bound and the mean of the distribution without affecting variance, or basic 
research could reduce λ  which would simultaneously increase the mean and the 
variance of the distribution.  Both of these effects of basic research are examined in 
the propositions to follow. These two propositions show that basic research causes a 
“crowding in” of applied research. 
Proposition 3: Basic research that either increases the lower bound or the mean of 
the potential yield distribution will increase the number of the private firm’s R&D 



















− λ ( y− θ )]
n A
e
− λ ( y− θ )
[1− e
− λ ( y− θ )]
H
> 0 
The numerator of the above comparative static is positive in sign given that 
1 ] 1 [ 1 0
) ( < − − <
θ − λ −
A n y e .  Moreover, from the SOC the denominator is negative in 
sign.  Hence, the whole fraction is positive, which means that there is a positive 
relationship between basic research that shifts the lower bound and the mean of the   16 
distribution and applied research.  Put differently, a firm invests more in R&D when 
more basic research is available. 
The intuition behind this is illustrated in Figure 1.  Figure 1 represents the 
probability function of the n
th order statistics for the exponential distribution. 
Parameter y shows the current yield level (state variable), while parameter θ  denotes 
the accumulation of scientific knowledge attributable to basic research or, in 
statistical language, θ  is the lower bound of the exponential distribution.  Note that 
the distribution is bounded from below (θ >0), which allows for a positive minimum 
guaranteed yield level.  When the stock of scientific knowledge increases, the 
parameter θ  is increased to θ
’, which in turn increases the mean of the probability 
distribution over all the possible yield levels as the distribution curve shifts to the 
right.  As mentioned earlier, the probability of inventing a variety that has higher 
yield than the current one based on a random draw is measured by the area to the 
right of the current yield level (y).  Hence, the rightward shift of the probability 
function, with a given current yield level, improves the probability (or the expected 
values) of inventing a higher-yielding variety than the current one as the area to the 
right of y increased.  Therefore, the expected benefits of a trial increase, which 
increases the optimal amount of private research.   
[Figure 1] 
Proposition 4: Basic research that reduces the parameter λ  in the exponential 
distribution, thereby increasing the variance and the mean of the exponential 
distribution, will increase the private firm’s R&D search and applied research 
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The first fraction at the numerator of the above comparative static result is positive in 
sign and the second one is negative in sign since  1 ] 1 [ 1 0
) ( < − − <
θ − λ −
A n y e .  
Moreover, from the SOC the denominator is negative in sign.  Consequently, the 
above comparative static result is negative in sign, or a decrease in λ  increases the 
number of trials (n).  Hence, an increase in the amount of basic research, which 
reduces λ , acts to increase the optimal amount of private applied research.  
Basic research increases the probability and expected value of inventing a 
variety yielding higher than the current one.  If this is modeled through a reduction in 
λ  then both the mean and the variance of the distribution increase without changing 
the lower bound.  The effect of a change in λ  is depicted in Figure 2.  The increase of 
the variance and the mean of the population sample (parameter λ ), given that the 
lower bound of the distribution (parameter θ ) and the current technology level 
(parameter y) remain constant, change the shape of the distribution.  The new 
distribution shifts to the right and becomes flatter, which results in an increase in the 
area to the right of y.  Hence, by increasing the variance and the mean of the 
probability distribution function, the likelihood (or probability) of inventing a variety 
with a yield level higher than the current one is increased.  This increases the 
expected benefits of a trial, thereby increasing the optimal amount of private research.    18 
[Figure 2] 
Proposition 5: For any given potential yield distribution, a higher current technology 

























− λ (y− θ )
[1− e
− λ (y− θ )]
H
< 0  
The numerator of the fraction at the above comparative static result is negative in sign 
since 1 ] 1 [ 1 0
) ( < − − <
θ − λ −
A n y e .  Moreover, from the SOC the denominator is negative 
in sign.  Hence, the sign of the whole is negative, which means that a change in 
current technology level y will lead to a same-direction change in the optimal number 
of trials firms undertake.   
Firms have less incentive to devote more resources to R&D when the current 
technology level, (y) is very high.  In statistical terms, the increase in the current 
technology level shifts y to the right in the distribution (see Figure 3).  This, in turn, 
reduces the area that measures the probability of inventing a better variety (area to the 
right of y).  Hence, the rightward shift y (current technology level) reduces the 
likelihood of inventing a higher-yielding variety.  This means that a higher existing 
technology reduces the expected return from an investment.   
[Figure 3] 
The following proposition examines the relationship between applied public 
research and applied private research.  It was shown that public basic research 
enhances the effectiveness of applied research because basic and applied researches   19 
are treated as complements.  However, when both public and private firms are 
engaged in applied research, their research is a substitute for each other’s.   
  Until this point two private firms in the industry were modeled.  For the 
analysis that follows, one of the firms B is public and firm A private.  The public firm 
autonomously chooses the level of research investment and the other firm reacts to 
this increasing expenditure as given by the reaction function in Section 2.3.  Once the 
public firm has made the autonomous research decision, it prices its product in a way 
similar to private firms as described above (Section 2.3).  This may be reasonable 
assumption given that many public institutions sell or give their varieties to private 
firms for marketing.11 
Proposition 6: Applied public research “crowds out” applied private research 
expenditure -- i.e., an increase in public applied research expenditure reduces the 
private firm’s R&D search and applied research expenditure. 
Proof: 























− c = 0 
Total differentiating the FOC in equation (21) with respect to endogenous n
A and the 
exogenous n
B and applying the Implicit Function Rule to produce the comparative 
static derivative dn
A/dn
B, this gives: 
                                                 
11 An alternative would be to model the pricing of product of the public firm equal to average cost.  
Although we do not explicitly model this situation, this type of behavior would further reduce private 















































Note that the denominator of the above comparative static is negative in sign while 
the numerator is positive.  Consequently, the whole fraction is negative in sign, which 
means that an increase in the public applied research negatively affects the quantity of 
private applied research.  To put it differently, the more applied research the public 
sector invests in, the less applied research the private sector undertakes.   
If we consider a small deviation from the symmetric equilibrium where 
E(∆ y
A)=E(∆ y
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implies that public applied research investment completely “crowds out” private 






negative but less than one in absolute value.  In this case there is an incomplete 
“crowding out” effect.  Consequently, public applied research is a substitute for 
(“crowds out”) applied private research regardless of the degree of product 
differentiation.   
The following propositions examine the relationship between product 
differentiation and applied research.  The first proposition deals with the effect of 
product differentiation on the private applied research expenditure.  The second   21 
proposition shows that product differentiation increases the prices charged for 
varieties, indicating an increase in market power.   
Proposition 7:  
(a) An increase in product differentiation τ  will not change the private firm’s R&D 
search and applied research expenditure. 
(b) When product differentiation τ  is increased, the price charged to the farmers is 
increased, while costs do not increase indicating an increase in the market power of 





















Note that from the SOC the denominator of the above comparative static is negative 
in sign.  The numerator represents the change in the marginal benefit of research 
investment with respect to product differentiation (parameter τ ).  Given that the 
numerator is zero, the whole fraction is zero.  Consequently, the R&D search 
intensity (number of trials) and in turn the investment in research the firm undertakes 



















= 0.  Consequently, the total 
derivative of  L p
y E y E p
w
B A




)] ( ) ( [ *  with respect to τ  is equal to the 
partial derivative of w














Hence, from the above comparative static, it can be concluded that τ  positively affects 
w
A.  In other words, the firms with the greater product differentiation can charge a 
higher price to the farmers.  The ability of the firm to charge a higher price for its 
variety while doing the same amount of R&D, indicates an increase in market power.  
Consequently, product differentiation also increases a firm’s profits at the expense of 
farmer welfare.   
Proposition 8: An increase in the intellectual property rights will increase the private 
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Note that the denominator of the above comparative static is the SOC of the expected 
profit maximization and is therefore negative in sign.  The numerator of the above 
expression represents the change in the marginal benefit of the research investment   23 
with respect to s.  Given that 0<e
-x<1, and that λ >0, z>0, y>0, then 
1 ] 1 [ 1 0
) ( < − − <
θ − λ −
A n y e , and the numerator will have a positive sign.  Hence, an 
increase in IPRs, s, will increase the private firm’s R&D search and applied research 
expenditure.  Put differently, a firm invests more in R&D, the more appropriable the 
research benefits are.   
The intuition behind the above result is as follows.  As shown, when s=1 the 
property rights are complete and the private demand for purchasing the variety is 
equal to the social or total demand for the variety.  An example in this case is a hybrid 
variety.  Farmers have to buy the seed every year in order to have the desirable traits 
so the research firm can fully extract all the future benefits from the hybrid varieties.  
As a result, the firm invests more in R&D.  In the intermediate situation, where 
0<s<1, the breeding firm can extract only part of the benefits provided to farmers.  An 
example is herbicide-tolerant varieties or designer varieties.  A breeding firm can 
extract the benefits the first year the farmers buy that varieties but the future benefits 
are uncertain.  In subsequent years farmers may decide to reproduce their own seed.  
Hence, breeders are unwilling to make the same investment, knowing only part of 
their investment cost can be recouped.  Finally, when s=0 no economic rent can be 
extracted from farmers, which in turn results in a very small R&D investment.   
The following proposition examines the relationship between a firm’s market 
size and the amount of investment in agricultural research.  Since the writings of 
Schumpeter (1934), numerous studies, mainly empirical, have been conducted to   24 
investigate the effect of firm’s size on R&D intensity.12  The results of those studies 
are controversial.  In the analysis that follows, the theoretical model developed in the 
previous section was modified to examine this issue.  It is assumed that farmers prefer 
variety A to variety B, so they are willing to pay more for variety A for any given 
level of ∆ y
A, ∆ y
B and w
B and less for variety B.  Given increased demand for variety 
A, the share of firm A is increased which increases the market size of that firm, while 
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where m denotes the increase of the producers’ willingness to pay for variety A and 
the reluctance of the producers’ willingness to pay for variety B.   
Proposition 9: An increase in a firm’s market size will increase the private firm’s 
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12 Schumpeter (1934), in his early work, argued that the small-scale entrepreneur is the main factor in 
capitalism’s vitality.  However, he changed his beliefs by the beginning of the 1940s.  In 1942 he 
stated that “large-scale enterprise has come to be the most powerful engine of [economic] progress” 
(Schumpeter 1942, p. 24).  Since then a lot of economists have provided evidence in both directions,   25 
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Note that the denominator of the above comparative static A for both fractions is the 
SOC of the expected profit maximization and is therefore negative in sign.  The 
numerator of the above expression represents the change in the marginal benefit of 
the research investment with respect to m.  Given that 0<e
-x<1, and that λ >0, z>0 and 
y>0, then  1 ] 1 [ 1 0
) ( < − − <
θ − λ −
A n y e , and the numerator of both fractions are positive 
in sign.  Hence, the sign of the comparative static is positive.  
From the above comparative static result, it can be concluded that the higher 
the value of m, the more research trials the research firm undertakes.  In other words, 
the bigger the market share of the firm, the more intense the R&D search which 
results in a bigger investment in research.  Hence, with an increase in the market size, 
the firm applies more effort to each approach of innovation, which in turn increases 
the probability of inventing a breakthrough technology.  As a result the expected 
value of the change in yield is increased.   
   2.6 Conclusions Regarding the Theoretical Model 
  A economic framework that modeled imperfectly competitive firms  using a 
search process to improve the yield of differentiated  varieties that are sold to 
                                                                                                                                           
with the predominant finding that, “in most industries, above a modest threshold firm size large firms 
are no more research intensive than smaller firms” (Cohen and Klepper 1992, p.1).    26 
heterogeneous farmers has created a tractable model  of investment, pricing and 
adoption.  The model, which reflect many of the features of today’s biotech industry, 
was useful in deriving a number of interesting and intuitively appealing comparative 
static results.   
 
3. A Study of the Private R&D Expenditures in Canola Crop Research in 
Canada  
  As a form of validation, this section uses the empirical evidence from the 
rapeseed/canola industry in Canada to examine some of the theoretical relationships 
derived in the previous section.  The canola research sector was selected for this 
empirical analysis because this industry has attracted significant private research 
investment and has undergone many changes, including the recent introduction of 
biotechnology and changes in Intellectual Property Rights (IPR).  Importantly, the 
data required for the analysis was also available due to the cooperation of private 
industry, public research institutions, and the personnel who manage the Inventory of 
Canadian Agricultural Research (ICAR) database.   
3.1. Overview of R&D Effort  
The development of the canola industry and the transformation of canola oil 
from a lubricant to a premium edible oil are the result of extensive genetic research in 
Canada.  At the beginning of the 1960s, rapeseed/canola was a minor crop, and no 
canola crushing industry existed.  By the beginning of 1990s, due to extensive 
research, canola had become a major crop and a large industry had been built around 
it.  In Canada, canola is probably the most recent and pronounced example of how   27 
research and development can improve the comparative advantage of an industry 
(Malla, Gray, and Phillips 1998).   
  The funding of canola research in Canada has undergone many changes since 
its inception in the mid-1950s when Agriculture Canada began a program to improve 
the palatability of the oil.  Over time, research shifted from a modest public research 
program to a large research industry dominated by private sector participation.  In 
1970, 83 per cent of the total research spending on canola R&D ($18 million) was 
public investment, while 17 per cent was private investment.  Ten years later, 
research investment was 69 per cent public versus 31 per cent private.  By 1999, the 
private sector’s share had grown to 70 per cent of the total $149 million expenditure 
(Canola Research Survey 1999).   
This funding shift is also evident in the registration of new varieties.  Prior to 
1973 all varieties (13 varieties) were public, while in the 1990-98 period 86 per cent 
of the varieties (162 varieties) were private (Canola Council of Canada 1998, CFIA 
(Canadian Food Inspection Agency) 1998).  This large shift in research shares is a 
result of the large increase in private sector investment rather than a reduction in 
public research. 
The change in the funding of research has coincided with a change in the 
nature of this R&D and the ownership of the property rights to the research and, 
implicitly, who captures the benefits from the investment (Canola Council of Canada 
1998, Malla, Gray and Phillips 1998).  Prior to 1990, all canola varieties were open-
pollinated and non-transgenic, and were not protected by the Plant Breeders Right’s 
Act, 1990 (Department of Justice 2000).  This meant that virtually all of the acreage   28 
was grown without a production agreement and producers had the right to retain 
production for future seed use and to sell non-registered seed to neighbors.  In 
contrast, by 1999, about 70 per cent of the canola acreage was seeded either to 
herbicide-tolerant (HT) varieties, which require annual technology use agreements or 
the use of specific herbicide, or hybrid varieties, which require annual purchase of the 
seed to retain the desirable traits.  Without the ability of producers to retain 
production for seed, plant breeders are now in a far better position to capture value 
from genetic innovation. Thus, biotechnology and changes in the IPRs have 
influenced the incentive for private research.   
Over time, the R&D effort for canola has shifted from modest public research 
investment to large, mainly private, investment.  This funding change is also evident 
in the registration of new varieties.  In the 1970s, all canola varieties were public, 
while now most of the canola varieties are privately owned.  Hence, the 
transformation of canola research sector provides a rich set of data to empirically 
examine factors that influence private research investment.   
3.2. Econometric Analysis  
The regression analysis that follows uses a reduced form of the theoretical 
model to examine whether the empirical evidence in canola research is consistent 
with the theoretical framework developed in the previous section.  It was not possible 
to develop a structural model, in large part due to the lack of detailed cross-sectional 
data.  The propositions derived in the previous section identify how a number of 
exogenous variables affect private applied research investments.  Hence, the selection 
of the exogenous variables in the model was based on the theoretical model   29 
developed in the previous section and the general economic theory.  Table 1 outlines 
each of the exogenous variables used in the empirical model and identifies which 
proposition they are related to, and the hypothesized direction of the effect these 
variables will have on private applied research expenditure.  These variables make up 
the general form of the model that is then subjected to a number of time series and 
specification tests.   
To determine an adequate specification of the model, the time-series 
properties of the variables in the model were examined.  To avoid any spurious 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables due to a unit root 
problem, individual series were tested for the presence of a unit root (i.e., I(1)).  The 
appropriate lag and lead lengths for a number of variables was determined by the AIC 
(Akaike Information Criterion).  The preliminary ADF test revealed that a unit root 
hypothesis could not be rejected in favor of a stationary one for almost all the 
variables [except the variable of the area seeded of canola crop which is I(0)] when it 
is measured in “level”.  Furthermore, the variable for private research expenditure is 
I(2); in other words, it has two unit roots (since the ADF test rejected the unit root 
hypothesis when taking the second difference).  Hence, a model specified “in level” 
or in first difference could result in a spurious estimate with little reliability.  Given 
the above findings about the nature of the series, the data were monotonically 
transformed by taking the logarithm of the series.  The log-linear model (or constant 
elasticity form) was selected because this is the most commonly used functional form, 
is very tractable and intuitively appealing (the regression coefficients can be 
interpreted in terms of elasticities).  After we transformed the series, the ADF tests   30 
were carried out and shown that all the variables are I(1) [with the exception of the 
private area and the Plant Breeders Rights dummy which are I(0)].  Taking the first 
difference of the logarithmic series and performing the ADF test again, we found that 
the unit root hypothesis was rejected in favor of the stationary one.  Consequently, the 
series were specified in a logarithmic form as a first difference13. 
To determine the variables that affect the private research investment and the 
extent of that effect, we estimated the general regression of the form:   
(36) dlnprct = β 0+β 1t + β 2dlnpcat-i+β 3dlnpcbt-i+β 4dlntit- i+β 5dlnprit+β 6dlnpit+β 7dlnat+ 
β 8dlnpt+β 9dlnaspt+β 10dlnpat+β 11dlnpra+β 12ddc+β 13dda+β 14ddht ±  i+ 
β 15PBR2t ±  i+εt 
[Table 1] 
To determine an adequate specification of the model, diagnostic checks for our 
functional form were carried out by performing the following specification tests.  
First, the redundant variable test for inclusion of irrelevant variables was conducted.  
Two standard test statistics were used, the F-test and the likelihood ratio test.  Second, 
in conjunction with the redundant variable tests, the specification error tests were also 
used.  Specifically, they were performed with two stability tests, the Ramsey’s 
Regression Specification Test (RESET) and the CUSUM test. 
                                                 
13 Logarithms were not taken for the four variables. The proportion of Canola™ varieties,  the 
proportion of Argentina varieties, the proportion of HT/hybrid varieties, and the PBR dummy have 
values of zero in some years.  However, we do take the first difference of these series (except of PBR 
dummy variable) to be consistent with the rest of the model.  When expressed as a first difference the 
PBR variable was adjusted by creating a seven year reaction curve for PBR centered on 1990 and 
normalized to sum to 1.  Specifically, the values of the PBR2 variable are zero prior to 1987, 1/16 in 
1987, 2/16 in 1988, 3/16 in 1989, 1/4 in 1990, 3/16 in 1991, 2/16 in 1992, and 1/16 in 1993. This form 
allows some anticipation of the legislation and well as a delayed reaction by parts of the private sector.   31 
Given that we have a time series model, testing for serial correlation is very 
important, since autocorrelated errors is a common finding in time series regression.  
To test for serial correlation, we use the Breusch-Godfrey Langrange Multiplier (LM) 
test.14  The results of the test indicate a first-order serial correlation in the residual 
AR(1).  Hence, the model was specified as an AR(1) process.  Finally, the appropriate 
lag lengths of the cost variables and the dummy variables were determined by the 
regression that minimizes the AIC.   
Based on the diagnostic and model specification tests three model 
specifications are kept and we rank these models according to the AIC and the 
adjusted R-squared.  The specification of the three regressions differs only with 
respect to the public applied-research variable.  The regression results for these 
models are reported in the last three columns of Table 2.  Model 1 (best fit model) in 
the fourth column, shows regression results for a 1-year lag in public applied research 
expenditures.  The second-best model on the basis of fit was a 1- and 5-year lag on 
the public applied research expenditure variable (fifth column of Table 2).  Finally, 
the third-best model on the basis of fit was a 5-year lag on public applied research 
expenditure variable (last column of Table 2).  The magnitudes of the regression 
coefficients in all the tables are very close.  The directions of the effect of exogenous 
variables on the private research expenditure are in the same direction in all the 
models except in the case of public expenditure on applied research.  Specifically, 
public expenditure on applied research with a one-year lag positively affects the 
                                                 
14The LM test is very general, since it can test for first-order, or high-order Auto Regressive Moving 
Average (ARMA) error.     32 
private research expenditure, while the public research expenditure with 5-year lags 
negatively affects the private R&D effort.   
[Table 2] 
The results of the three regressions appear to be robust.  Most of the estimated 
coefficients are individually statistically significant at the 5 per cent level.15  All the 
explanatory variables have the expected signs.  Moreover, all regressions have an R 
2 
between 41 per cent and 51 per cent. 
Overall, the econometric results provide empirical evidence to support the 
theoretical model developed in previous chapters.  Specifically, it was found that the 
effect of public applied research on private applied research expenditure have two 
directions: in the very short run (1-year lag) causes “crowding in” of private applied 
research, while in the longer run (5-year lag) it causes “crowding out.”  Public applied 
research expenditure with a 1-year lag has a coefficient of .28 in the first model and 
.25 in the combined model, implying that, ceteris paribus, that a 1 per cent increase in 
the annual public applied research in one year increases the private research the next 
year by .28 per cent.16  While, public applied research expenditure with a lag of 5-
year lag has a coefficient ranging from -.14 to -.07.  The very short run positive effect 
of public applied research might be caused by the MII (Matching Initiative Funds) 
program, where private research investment is matched with public research 
                                                 
15 The significance of the coefficient on the biotechnology variable varies from almost 1% to 20% 
while the coefficient on the variable of public expenditure on applied research ranges from 2% to 20%.  
These variables were retained because removing them from these models increase the AIC values and 
hence reduce the fit of the model significantly. 
16 If the true model is ln y = a + b lnx  then ∆ lny = b ∆ lnx, The coefficient b can be interpreted as either 
as dlny/dlnx which is the elasticity of y w.r.t. x, or equally as d∆ lny/d∆ lnx, which is the elasticity of the 
rate of change in y w.r.t. the rate of change in x.  Both interpretations are equally valid given the 
elasticities are equal to the same coefficient, b.     33 
investment.  Another possible explanation is that public agencies may spend greater 
resources just prior to the sale of germplasm to a private company.  The private 
company then spends greater resources for development.   
The empirical analysis reveals a positive relationship between public basic 
research expenditure and applied private research expenditure.  The coefficient of 
public expenditure on basic research is ranging from .20 to .22 in the three models.  
Because the public basic research expenditure is only 24 per cent of applied private 
research expenditures, a one dollar increase in public research expenditure will bring 
about a 90 per cent increase in private applied research expenditure ($1.00/.24 x .22 = 
$0.90).  This result provides empirical evidence of the “crowding in” effect of public 
basic research.   
Consistent with a search model of investment, it was found that the total yield 
index, which shows the current technology level on crop breeding research, 
negatively affects the level of private investment.  The coefficient of the yield index 
is ranging from –4.18 to –4.51 in the three models.  In contrary, the private yield 
index positively affects the investment level.  The coefficient of private yield index is 
ranging from 2.16 to 2.19.  The private yield index variable denotes the current level 
of private technology.  In other words, this will tend to be correlated with the private 
sector or the firm size.  The larger the private market size, the higher the probability 
of inventing a breakthrough technology, either because the private sector’s ability to 
take advantage of the public research available is increased or it has the “know-how” 
and the stock of genes.  This in turn results in a larger investment in R&D.  This 
empirical finding is in line with the theoretical result of the model.     34 
Furthermore, it was shown that, the larger the area seeded, the larger the 
private research investment.  The coefficient of the current total acres seeded of 
rapeseed/canola is ranging from .09 to .17 in the three models.  This result denotes 
that the higher the rate at which the crop is adopted, the larger the size of the market 
and the larger the private research investment.   
Finally, biotechnology and the accompanying increased enforceability of 
property rights positively affects private applied research investment.  The coefficient 
of biotechnology dummy is ranging from .74 to .89 in the three models.  This result is 
consistent with the theoretical findings that the more complete the IPRs (Intellectual 
Property Rights), the more intensive a private firm’s R&D effort, which in turn 
results in a bigger investment in research.  The differentiated products produced from 
biotechnology have enhanced the ability of research firms to enforce IPRs and 
capture the value of their innovation from the marketplace.  Hybrid varieties require 
the purchase of the seed every year to keep the desirable traits, and herbicide-tolerant 
varieties require the annual purchase of a specialized, patented chemical.   
Overall, the econometric results are in accordance with the analytical results 
derived in this study.  The econometric analysis, using data from the canola industry 
provided empirical evidence to support the analytical framework and the propositions 
derived in this study.  This consistency between the analytical and empirical findings 
strengthens the validity of the analytical framework developed.   
4. Summary and Conclusion 
  Crop research has undergone a major transformation in North America and 
many other parts of the world.  The introduction of biotechnology and Intellectual   35 
Property Rights (IPR) allows the creation of excludable, non-rival goods.  This, in 
turn, stimulates private investment and changes the structure of the agricultural 
research industry.  The implications of these changes are not fully understood.   
  The goal of this analysis is to develop a broader understanding of how 
biotechnology, changes in IPRs and the resulting changes in industry structure have 
affected the private incentives for agricultural research.  To achieve the objective of 
this study, a three-stage search/imperfect competition model is developed 
characterized by two research firms developing and selling differentiated products to 
heterogeneous farmers.  Agricultural research is modeled with explicit recognition of 
the search process, which allows us to recognize research as a stochastic process with 
sporadic outcomes and to explicitly model the interaction between basic and applied 
research.   
The theoretical results of this study are mainly in form of propositions.  
Specifically, it was shown that the public role in research is very important in 
enhancing the productivity of the applied research because basic public research 
causes a “crowding in” of private applied research.  However, applied public research 
“crowds out” applied private research.  It was also shown that the current technology 
level, in our case yield level, negatively affects private investment.  This is similar to 
the effect that technology level has on the cost of the experimentation.  However, 
when the price of the final product (the price that farmers receive) is increased, a 
private firm’s R&D search is more intense.  Moreover, it was concluded that, the 
greater the product heterogeneity, the higher the price charged with the same amount   36 
of R&D.  Finally, it was claimed that the increase in the IPR and the firm’s market 
size has a positive effect on the private firm’s amount of R&D investment.   
The econometric analysis, using data from the canola industry provided 
empirical evidence to support the analytical framework and the propositions derived 
in this study.  Public basic research caused an increase in private research, as did an 
increase in the price and area seeded to canola. While recent applied public research 
expenditure caused and increase in private investment, in the longer run applied 
public investment tended to crowd out private investment.  The overall yield index 
had a negative effect on investment,  while the private yield index had a positive 
effect on investment.  The introduction of biotechnology products that provided 
effective IPR protection increased the research investment.  Overall, the empirical 
results were very consistent with the theoretical findings. 
A number of policy implications can be drawn from the derived propositions.  
The first point to make is that, for a given distribution of potential outcomes, there is 
a diminishing return to applied research.  This was shown with proposition 3.5, where 
the higher the current technology level (or research findings), the lower the intensity 
for the private R&D search, since the probability of inventing a better variety is 
reduced.  Consequently, research into new crops may be more profitable than into 
well-established ones.   
  Moreover, basic research is required to maintain the profitability of applied 
research given that applied research is a search process.  Eventually, the current 
technology level will reach a point where further search is no longer economically   37 
viable.  Therefore, for applied research to remain profitable in the long run, basic 
research is required to create new distributions.   
  Furthermore, it was shown that while, applied public research “crowds out” 
applied private research, the opposite holds for basic public research.  Hence, these 
propositions suggest that where a private research industry exists, the public sector 
should shift resources from applied to basic research.  This will increase the pace of 
innovation and research outcomes.   
A combination of the “crowd out” proposition and the first proposition, which 
shows a negative relationship between marginal cost of experimentation and number 
of research trials, has implications for the type of support given to the research 
industry. Specifically, government policies that reduce the cost of research –e.g., per 
unit subsidy increase private investment in R&D.  Conversely, public policies that 
compete with the private sector –e.g., public firms invest in applied research -- would 
“crowd out” private research investment.  Consequently, subsidy may be more 
effective means to increase applied private R&D investment.   
  The analysis also reveals an interesting dynamic feedback effect between 
market size and R&D intensity.  A firm with a market size advantage will do more 
research.  By applying more effort to each approach to innovation, the probability of 
success also rise, which increases the expected value of the yield change and causes 
an even greater market share.  In turn, this allows to crowds firm with smaller market 
share out of existence, which ultimately results in a concentrated industry with fewer 
research products.  If one goes beyond the scope of our analysis to consider variety A 
and B as different crops, then private investment in a large crop will tend to crowd out   38 
the research and production of smaller crops.  Hence, this finding is in favor of large-
scale firms, which supports Schumpeter’s hypothesis.   
Finally, the increase in appropriability of research benefits via IPRs could 
have a significant effect on the R&D intensity and welfare implications.  An increase 
in IPRs, while stimulating research investment will leave producers worse off because 
they will then pay higher prices for varieties.  From the social welfare prospective, 
policy makers have to be aware of the trade-off between overall efficiency and 
producer welfare.  It should be noted, however, that the above analysis assumes that 
both varieties A and B will exist in the presence of incomplete IPRs, which may not 
be the case.  If private research firms are unable to reap sufficient returns to pay for 
the fixed cost involved in research, they may not invest at all which would leave 
farmers conceivably worse off.     39 
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Table 1: Description of the variables used in the econometric analysis. 
Acro-nym* Varables
**  Source of Prior Belief  Expected 
Sign 
Dependent variable: dlnprct  (private applied research expenditure for year t) 
t  time trend     
dlnpcat-i  public applied research 
expenditure for year t 
minus i years of lag, 
Proposition 3.5: Crowding-out 
effect 
- 
dlnpcbt-i  public basic research 
expenditure for a year t 
minus i years of lag, 
Proposition 3.3: Crowding-in 
effect 
+ 
dlntit  total yield index for 
year t 
Proposition 3.4: The higher the 
current yield level, the less the 
applied R&D investment 
- 
dlnprit  private yield index for 
year t 
Proposition 5.1: The larger the 
market size of the firm, the 
larger the applied R&D 
investment 
+ 
dlnpit  public yield index for 
year t 
Proposition 3.5: Crowd-out 
effect. 
+ 
dlnat  area seeded of canola 
crop for year t 
Proposition 5.1: The larger 
market size, the larger the 
applied R&D investment 
+ 
dlnpt  farm-gate price of 
canola for year t 
Proposition 3.2: The higher the 
product price, the larger the 
applied R&D investment 
+ 
dlnaspt  area seeded to canola 
times the farm-gate 
price of canola for year 
t 
Interaction of effects in 
Propositions 5.1 and 3.2 
+ 
dlnpat  area seeded to public 
canola varieties for year 
t 
Proposition 3.5: Crowding-out 
effect. 
- 
dlnprat  area seeded by private 
canola varieties for year 
t 
Proposition 5.1: The larger the 
market size, the larger the 
applied R&D investment 
+ 
ddct  proportion of the total 
canola area that is 
seeded to Canola™ 
varieties in year t 
Exogenous quality adjustment 
(Malla and 1999) 
+ 
ddat  proportion of the total 
canola area seeded to 
Argentina (b. napus) 
varieties in year t 
Yield index adjustment  (Malla 
and Gray 1999) 
 
+ 
ddht ±  i  proportion of the total 
canola area seeded to 
Proposition 4.1: The more 
complete the IPR, the larger 
+   48 
herbicide-tolerant and 
hybrids varieties in year 
t minus/plus i years of 
lag/lead 
the applied R&D investment. 
dPBR2t ±  i  Plant Breeders’ Rights 
dummy variable 
minus/plus i years of 
lag/lead 
Proposition 4.1: The more 
complete the IPR, the larger 
the applied R&D investment 
+ 
*All variables are in the first difference of logarithms,(denoted as dln in the acronym) except the 
variables current proportion of area seeded to canola  varieties; current proportion of area seeded to 
Argentine (b.napus) varieties; and lead/lag of Plant Breeders’ Rights Dummy.  For these variables, a 
simple first difference is used (denoted as dd in the acronym). 
**Time series data were calculated based on the following sources: 
dlnprct, dlnpcat-i, dlnpcbt-i : Canola Research Survey (1999); Nagy and Furtan (1977); ISI (1997), 
Phillips (1997); ICAR (1998, 2000); and CFIA special tabulation provided upon request (1998), 
dlntit, dlnprit, dlnpit: Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food, Varieties of Grain Crops in Saskatchewan 
(various issues); Nagy and Furtan (1978); Prairie Pools Inc. Prairie Pools Variety Survey (various 
issues); and the authors’ estimates based on the Manitoba Crop Insurance Corporation Variety Survey 
(wepage, access June 2000), 
dlnat, dlnpat, dlnprat: Nagy and Furtan (1978); Prairie Pools Inc., Prairie Pools Variety Survey 
(various issues); CFIA special tabulation provided upon request (1998); and the authors’ estimates 
based on the Manitoba Crop Insurance Corporation Variety Survey (wepage, access June 2000), 
dlnpt: Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food, Market Trend (various issues); and Saskatchewan 
Agriculture and Food, Agricultural Statistics (1999); and Statistics Canada, Direct CANSIM Time 
Series: CPI and All Goods for Canada (wepage, access June 2000), 
ddct, ddat, : Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food, Varieties of Grain Crops in Saskatchewan (various 
issues); Prairie Pools Inc., Prairie Pools Variety Survey (various issues); Nagy and Furtan (1978); and 
the authors’ estimates based on the Manitoba Crop Insurance Corporation Variety Survey, 
ddht ± ± ± ±  i: Saskatchewan Agriculture and Food, Varieties of Grain Crops in Saskatchewan (various 
issues); Prairie Pools Inc. Prairie Pools Variety Survey (various issues); Nagy and Furtan (1978); the 
authors’ estimates based on the Manitoba Crop Insurance Corporation Variety Survey; and CFIA 
(wepage, access June 2000), 
dPBR2t ± ± ± ±  i: authors’ estimates based on the fact that PBR came into force August 1, 1990 (Department 
of Justice, wepage, access May 2000).   49 
Table 2: The Final Regression Results 
Variable














Private applied research expenditure 
(dependant variable) 
dlnprct        






Lagged public applied research 
expenditure lag –1 





Lagged public applied research 
expenditure lag –5 




Lagged public basic research 
expenditure lag –5 


















Current public yield index  dlnpit +  na 
 
na na 
Current total area seeded of 
rapeseed/canola  






Current farm gate price of 
rapeseed/canola 
dlnpt +  na 
 
na na 
Current area seeded times the price of 
rapeseed/canola 
dlnaspt +  na  na  na 
Current area seeded to public 
rapeseed/canola varieties 
dlnpat -  na  na  na 
Current area seeded to private 
rapeseed/canola varieties  
dlnprat +  na  na  na 
Current proportion of  area seeded to 
Canola™  varieties 
ddct  + na  na  na 
Current proportion of area seeded to 
Argentine (b. napus) varieties 
ddat  - na  na  na 
Proportion of area seeded to HT and 
hybrid varieties lead +3 






Lead/lag of Plant Breeders’ Rights 
Dummy 
dPBR2t ±  i  + na  na  na 












Akaike info criterion       -1.76  -1.72  -1.58 
R
2     0.645 .66  .57 
2 R  
   .51  .50  .41 
Source: Author’s Regression Estimates 
*To address unit root problems, all variables are calculated in the first difference of 
logarithms,(denoted as dln in the acronym) except the variables current proportion of area seeded to 
canola  varieties; current proportion of area seeded to Argentine (b.napus) varieties; and lead/lag of 
Plant Breeders’ Rights Dummy.  For these variables, a simple first difference is used (denoted as dd in 
the acronym). 